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Abstract 
It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those 
characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding 
of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such 
descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and 
comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the 
distinction between folk and scientific psychology that can support such claims.  Moreover, these 
sorts of claims can have adverse consequences for the neuroscientific study of the brain by 
downplaying the value of many psychological theories that provide information neuroscientists 
need in order to build and test neurological models. 
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2. Propositional Attitudes in Scientific Theories 
3. Where the ‘Folk’ and the ‘Scientific’ Part Ways 
4. Grounding Scientific Terminology in Scientific Theory and Experimentation 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a battle was waged amongst philosophers of mind for the soul 
of modern psychology and cognitive science (although the first salvo in this battle was fired long 
before this). This battle was to determine whether traditional psychological vocabulary such as 
‘beliefs’, ‘desires’, and ‘intentions’, had a legitimate place within the scientific study of 
psychology.  The attribution or ascription of these propositional attitudes to agents as a means of 
predicting and explaining behaviour became widely known as ‘folk’ psychology, to be 
contrasted with the more mechanical explanations emerging from neuroscience and cognitive 
science regarding the transformation of sensory inputs into behavioural outputs.  The question of 
whether folk psychology could find a place within this new scientific framework was a topic of 
much debate, with philosophers and psychologists taking up arms on different sides of the 
battlefield. 
 While the battle itself is not being fought to the same degree it was a few decades ago, its 
effects have been widespread, and continue to influence scientists and researchers working today 
in numerous different academic disciplines.  From comparative and animal psychology 
(Papineau & Heyes [2006]; Shettleworth [2010]; Penn [2012]), to psychiatry (Murphy [2014]), 
to economics (Guala [2012]), to criminal law (Commons & Miller [2011]; Morse [2011a], 
[2011b]), the assumption that propositional attitude ascriptions (hereafter PAAs) are rooted in a 
folk, and not a scientific, understanding of the mind is commonplace.  Meanwhile, the fact that 
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PAAs are frequently invoked as part of scientific theories within these domains has not 
discouraged many theorists from insisting that their usage in such contexts remains folk 
psychological.  It is argued that because mentalistic terms such as ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ get their 
meaning from a pre-scientific conceptual framework, to import them into psychological theories 
is still to adhere to a folk psychological account of the mind. In order to truly be validated as 
scientific psychology, PAAs must first be shown to either successfully identify natural kinds, be 
mapped to cognitive/neurological states of the brain, or prove indispensable to scientific practice. 
Failure to meet any of these criteria is a failure to secure itself within legitimate scientific 
psychology, even if employed within psychological theories in domains like social or 
comparative psychology. 
 In this paper, I argue that such views are ultimately unsupportable, and can have adverse 
consequences for the neuroscientific study of the brain.  My intention is not to reignite the war, 
but to demonstrate that PAAs need not validate their role within current scientific psychology in 
order to be scientific, as opposed to folk, psychology.  Instead, their very presence within current 
psychological theories guarantees their status as scientific psychology.  This is the case 
irrespective of whether they originated from a pre-scientific conceptual framework, or whether 
they will ever find a place within our best neuroscientific and cognitive accounts of the mind. 
The only criterion that is relevant for determining whether the usage of mentalistic terminology 
is folk or scientific is whether it is informed by scientific theories and experimentation in that 
context.  So long as the application of a mentalistic term like ‘belief’ or ‘intention’ is in accord 
with legitimate scientific methodology and practice, then that usage is not folk psychological and 
is as scientific as any other term used in our best theories of psychology and neuroscience. 
 Moreover, I propose that classifying certain mentalistic terms as folk psychological when 
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they are embedded in scientific theories can result in the tendency to be dismissive of those 
theories, or to view them as having limited scientific value. Yet psychological theories which 
invoke PAAs often provide a wealth of information regarding the sorts of behaviours performed 
by cognitive systems, the conditions under which particular behaviours occur, and the time frame 
in which behaviours are carried out. This information puts essential constraints on how to build 
and test models needed in the study of the system’s underlying neurological mechanisms.  The 
mere fact that these psychological theories and models employ certain mentalistic terminology in 
the course of generating such data is not relevant to the value of this data in helping us to identify 
and study the causal mechanisms of the system. 
 In Section 2 of this paper, I examine the tendency amongst many theorists to view 
scientific theories which invoke traditional mentalistic terminology as still engaging in folk 
psychology.  In section 3, I detail the different arguments that could be offered to defend such a 
claim, and demonstrate why each fails.  In section 4, I outline a more helpful way of thinking 
about the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that better accounts for the usage of 
PAAs within contemporary psychology.  Lastly, in section 5, I demonstrate why mislabelling 
PAAs as folk psychological in scientific contexts can have negative consequences for the 
neuroscientific study of the brain. 
 
2 Propositional Attitudes in Scientific Theories 
 
The idea that certain types of mentalistic descriptions, specifically those characterized as 
propositional attitudes, are part of folk psychology is a view that has been widely held in the 
philosophy of mind. As Matthew Ratcliffe notes: 
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[There is] an account of ‘commonsense’ or ‘folk’ psychology [that] is routinely accepted, 
according to which its central element is the attribution of intentional states, principally 
beliefs and desires, in order to predict and explain behaviour. ([2007], p. 223) 
 
For some explicit examples, consider E.J. Lowe who defines folk psychology as ‘our 
propositional attitude vocabulary’, and our ‘belief-desire discourse’ ([2000], p. 62). Or Stephen 
Stich, who defines folk psychology as the attribution of any psychological state that is 
‘characteristically attributed by invoking a sentence with an embedded “content sentence”.’ 
([1983], p. 5). Likewise, John Heil defines folk psychology as ‘the practice of explaining 
behavior by reference to the propositional attitudes.’ ([2004], p. 152).  Similar claims can be 
found in the works of Chuchland [1981]; Dennett [1987]; Ramsey, Stich & Garon [1990]; 
Morton [1996]; Haselager [1997]; Bickle [2003]; Godfrey-Smith [2005]; Gauker [2009], and 
many others.
1
 
 Interestingly, this idea has not been limited to philosophy, and in recent years has found 
its way into numerous other scientific and academic fields, such as criminal law, economics, 
social psychology, comparative psychology, and psychiatry.  This is particularly noteworthy 
because many of these domains frequently employ PAAs as part of scientific theories and 
models. Is the application of PAAs in these scientific contexts still to be considered folk 
psychological, or does our propositional attitude vocabulary and belief-desire discourse count as 
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting that for the purposes of this paper, I neither presuppose, nor reject, the theory-
theory of mind (as opposed to simulation-theory, or the more embodied accounts of folk 
psychology). The question of whether the way in which we understand others in daily life 
requires the use of PAAs is, for my present purposes, irrelevant. The relevant question is: why 
are so many convinced that the use of PAAs are part of a ‘folk’ understanding of the mind 
instead of a scientific one?  
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full-fledged scientific psychology in such cases, with the same scientific status as discourse 
about neurological mechanisms and chemical interactions?  Many have proposed that the 
presence of PAAs within such psychological theories is insufficient to lift them out of the realm 
of folk psychology and into the domain of scientific psychology. For a straightforward example, 
consider the following claim from Derek Penn: 
 
Folk psychology has plagued every domain of comparative psychology (Penn and 
Povinelli [2007a]; Penn et al. [2008]). Research on animals’ ToM [Theory of Mind] 
abilities has, however, been held hostage by folk psychology to a degree far beyond any 
other domain. Effectively, most comparative researchers in this domain are not practicing 
comparative cognitive psychology but rather ‘comparative folk psychology’; that is, the 
study of nonhuman minds from a folk psychological perspective. ([2012], p. 257) 
 
Penn defends this claim by arguing that comparative psychologists import mentalistic vocabulary 
from a pre-scientific conceptual framework of the mind into their analysis of animal behaviour, 
instead of providing an account of said behaviour in terms of more accurate computational or 
neurological theories of the mind.  In Penn’s own words: 
 
Comparative psychologists regularly claim that animals have an ‘understanding of’ or 
‘insight into’ some folk psychological concept in order to falsify claims that the animal’s 
cognitive processes are rule-governed and unconscious. […] Nearly all the most 
prominent claims in support of attributing a ToM to nonhuman animals are framed using 
folk psychological idioms (e.g., ‘chimpanzees know what their groupmates do and do not 
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know,’ ‘ chimpanzees can distinguish between an experimenter that is unwilling or 
unable to give them food,’ ‘scrub jays can project their own experience of being a thief 
onto the observing bird’) without any attempt to cash out these claims at a computational, 
algorithmic, or neural level of explanation. ([2012], p. 256) 
 
Note that according to Penn, PAAs are still folk psychological when employed as part of explicit 
theories and models within comparative psychology.  In order to reach the status of scientific 
psychology, they must first be a characterizable in terms of more acceptable neurological or 
cognitive accounts. 
This assumption that PAAs remain folk psychological even when used as part of explicit 
theories within comparative or animal psychology can likewise be found in the work of Papineau 
& Heyes [2006].  They claim that: 
 
Perhaps nowadays we understand the question [‘are animals rational?’] in terms of two 
styles of cognitive explanation. This certainly seems to be the way that many 
psychologists understand the issue. On the one hand lie ‘rational’ explanations of 
behaviour, explanations that advert to norm-governed reasoning involving belief-like 
representations. On the other side lie non-rational explanations, in terms of ‘behaviourist’ 
or (more accurately) associative psychological processes. […]  We suspect that the 
rational–associative dichotomy is just Descartes dressed up in modern garb. In place of 
Descartes’ immaterial mind we have the accolades of ‘folk psychology’, and in place of 
his brute matter we have ‘associative machines’. ([2006], p. 188) 
 
  
8 
 
Papineau & Heyes go on to argue that this dichotomy is ultimately a false one, despite many 
advocates within psychology arguing for one side or the other.  What’s important to note for our 
purposes is that for Papineau & Heyes, many psychologists who adopt rational explanations of 
behaviour within their theories are still employing a folk psychological account of the mind.  For 
instance, regarding the interpretation of the behaviour of birds in scientific experiments, they 
claim that… 
 
…it is easy, perhaps irresistible, to interpret sensitivity to demonstrator reward in folk-
psychological terms. We naturally assume that the birds who imitated did so because they 
wanted food and believed that performing the same action as the demonstrator would 
enable them to get it. ([2006], p. 188) 
 
But what is it exactly that makes mentalistic terms like ‘wanted’ and ‘believed’ folk 
psychological terms when employed in such a manner by comparative psychologists?  Clearly 
comparative psychologists who come to such an ‘irresistible’ conclusion are still generating an 
interpretation of the data they’ve gathered by working within the confines of proper scientific 
practices, forming theories based on empirical observation and experimentation.  So why then 
are these not clear cut cases of scientific psychological terms?  What justifies Papineau & 
Heyes’s insistence that this is a folk psychological interpretation of the behaviour of the birds? 
This is a question they never explicitly address, however it is implied that this ‘folk 
psychological’ interpretation of animal behaviour is at odds with the more mechanical 
understanding of the mind provided by cognitive science and neuroscience. 
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 This view that PAAs need to do more than merely be part of scientific theories in order to 
count as scientific psychology can likewise be found in other academic domains.  Consider 
criminal law.  According to Stephen Morse: 
 
Brief reflection should indicate that the law’s psychology must be a folk psychological 
theory, a view of the person as a conscious (and potentially self-conscious) creature who 
forms and acts on intentions that are the product of the person’s other mental states such 
as desires, beliefs, willings, and plans. We are the sorts of creatures that can act for and 
respond to reasons, including legal rules and standards that are expressed and understood 
linguistically. ([2011a], p. 531) 
 
In a similar vein, he claims that criminal law presupposes a ‘folk psychological view’ because it 
explains human behaviour by appealing to ‘mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, 
volitions, and plans’ (Morse [2011b], p. 378), and that certain defences in law ‘involve folk 
psychology because they are based on mental states, including desires and beliefs.’ ([2011b], p. 
379).
 
 
Of course, it is certainly possible that criminal law is based on folk, and not scientific, 
psychology.  However, it is something quite different to insist, as Morse does, that criminal law 
presupposes folk psychology because it attributes certain kinds of mental states to people.  After 
all, many scientific theories in psychology are similarly based on mental states in exactly this 
way, often invoking mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, volitions and plans. What 
are we to say about these cases?  Morse himself acknowledges that scientists do indeed appeal to 
such mental states in their theories and often debate how best to define them (Morse [2011a], p. 
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530). Yet, despite this, he insists that such usage still counts as folk psychological on the grounds 
that folk psychology requires ‘only that human action is in part causally explained by mental 
states’ (Morse [2011a], p. 530).  Yet, what could justify such a claim? 
According to Morse, the folk psychological status of such mentalistic terms stem from 
the fact that they originated from a pre-scientific understanding of the mind and do not fit with 
our current best theories from neuroscience and cognitive science. As he notes, ‘many scientists 
and philosophers of mind and action consider folk psychology to be a primitive or pre-scientific 
view of human behaviour.’ (Morse [2011a], p. 532).  Thus even if psychologists employ PAAs 
as part of their current theories, given that their meanings are still rooted in a pre-scientific 
understanding of human behaviour, and are at odds with emerging neuroscientific/cognitive 
evidence, their usage remains folk psychological when imported into those scientific contexts.
 
This kind of argument is not uncommon, and can be found elsewhere in philosophy 
(Churchland [1981]; Ramsey, Stich & Garon [1990]), comparative psychology (Shettleworth 
[2010]), criminal law (Commons & Miller [2011]), and economics (Guala [2012]).  To sum up, 
many have claimed that being part of explicit scientific theories and models in domains like 
social psychology and comparative psychology does not by itself grant PAAs the status of 
scientific psychology.  I intend to demonstrate that such claims are incorrect, and that the 
intuitions which underlie them confused.  In order to demonstrate why, I will examine in detail 
the different arguments that could be used to justify the claim that PAAs remain folk 
psychological when used as part of theories and models in domains like social psychology or 
comparative psychology. 
 
3 Where the ‘Folk’ and the ‘Scientific’ Part Ways 
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I propose that there is no plausible way to carve the folk/scientific distinction so that PAAs, as 
used by current psychologists, fall on the side of folk psychology. In order to see why, let us 
consider the different ways one might try to argue for the claim that PAAs remain folk 
psychological even when embedded in psychological theories or models.  One rather 
straightforward reason for believing PAAs are folk psychological can be understood as follows: 
 
1. Even if descriptions which employ PAAs are used as part of theories in scientific 
domains like social psychology and comparative psychology, the meaning of mentalistic 
terms like ‘beliefs’ and ‘intentions’ are entirely determined by their place within the folk 
conceptual framework from which they originated. 
 
Unlike scientific concepts, whose meanings are determined by their place within scientific 
theories, the meanings of the mentalistic terms found in PAAs appear to be determined by their 
place within the folk theories from which they sprang. This is why, even if they are used within 
scientific domains like social or comparative psychology, the vocabulary itself remains folk. Paul 
Churchland, for instance, argues that PAAs are folk psychological because they are rooted in a 
‘common-sense conceptual framework for mental phenomena’ ([1981], p. 69). This point is 
echoed by Daniel Dennett, who argues that the folk status of PAAs is grounded in the fact that 
the mentalistic terms they employ originated from ordinary language: 
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Since the terms ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ and their kin are parts of ordinary language, like 
‘magnet’, rather than technical terms like ‘valence,’ we must first look to ‘folk 
psychology’ to see what kind of things we are being asked to explain. ([1987], p. 46) 
 
But if this is indeed a good reason for labelling PAAs ‘folk’, then it would seem to commit us, at 
least prima facie, to the idea that most of contemporary physics is similarly folk, and not 
scientific, physics. 
 Consider: Long before there existed anything like a rigorous scientific account of 
physics, we commonly explained and predicted the behaviour of physical systems by employing 
terms like ‘time’, ‘space’, and ‘motion’.  These terms were rooted in a common-sense conceptual 
framework for physical phenomena, and were likewise part of ordinary language. From this, do 
we therefore conclude that any use of the terms ‘time’, ‘space’, or ‘motion’ within the context of 
physics today is thereby an instance of folk physics, in virtue of originating from an undeniably 
folk conceptual framework?  If so, then the vast majority of contemporary physics would 
constitute folk physics given their common use of such vocabulary. And considering that even 
our best neuroscientific accounts of the mind similarly make use of the concept of ‘time’, then 
neuroscientific theories would be as much a part of folk psychology as PAAs are.
2
 Yet most 
would deny that contemporary neuroscience is folk psychology. But if we are to deny this, then 
what spares terms like ‘time’ and ‘space’ from a folk fate when imported into scientific contexts, 
but not the mentalistic terms found in PAAs? Clearly the meanings of ‘time’ and ‘space’ 
originated from ordinary language usage just as ‘beliefs’, and ‘desires’ did. 
                                                 
2
 After all, such neuroscientific theories would be part of a psychology that predicts and explains 
human behaviour by employing concepts which are rooted in a folk conceptual framework (i.e. 
‘time’). 
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 One plausible response is that concepts like ‘time’, ‘space’, and ‘motion’ have been 
refined and altered by scientific practices, theories, and experimentation in physics.  The notion 
of ‘time’ used by scientific physics is different from the folk notions that spawned it. The sorts of 
inferences we draw about time in folk contexts are different from the sorts of inferences we draw 
about time in the context of contemporary physics. For instance, in folk contexts it is common to 
believe that two events either happen simultaneously, or they do not.  Yet we know that in the 
context of scientific physics, such a generalization does not apply. It is for this reason that 
concepts like ‘time’ are no longer folk when employed in contemporary physics. 
 This is certainly a reasonable response, but it is one that applies equally well to our use of 
the mentalistc concepts embedded in PAAs. Scientific domains like social psychology, 
comparative psychology, and developmental psychology often draw very different sorts of 
inferences from the ascriptions of propositional attitudes than do people in everyday folk 
contexts.  As a straightforward example, consider the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) in 
social psychology (Ajzen [1985], [1988], [1991]). The TPB is a model of human behaviour that 
has enjoyed a great deal of predictive success regarding a range of human behaviours.
3 
 
 The TPB predicts human behaviour by ascribing propositional attitudes such as beliefs 
and intentions to agents, but also involves the ascription of things like subjective and cultural 
norms, as well as a perceived sense of behavioural control. It likewise takes various 
environmental conditions into account when generating predictions. In folk contexts, however, 
our use of PAAs to predict and explain behaviour is very different. Most people in folk contexts 
draw inferences about human behaviour directly from the ascriptions of propositional attitudes 
                                                 
3
 For empirical studies on the predictive successes of the TPB, see: Ajzen & Driver [1992]; Blue 
[1995]; Connor & Sparks [1996]; Godin & Kok [1996]; Hausenblas et al. [1997]; Armitage & 
Conner [2001]. 
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while completely ignoring cultural and environmental factors (Ross & Nisbett [1991]).
4
 The TPB 
on the other hand, is sensitive to both in a way that folk accounts are not. This means that we 
draw different inferences from PAAs in folk contexts than we do in scientific contexts. What this 
shows is that folk concepts like ‘beliefs’ have likewise been refined and altered by psychological 
practices, theories, and experimentation.  As a result, just as in the physics case involving ‘time’, 
the notion of ‘belief’ used by scientific psychologists is different from the folk notions that 
spawned it. 
 Some may object that the notions of ‘belief’ used by the different branches of psychology 
are still similar enough to the everyday conception that it still warrants being considered folk 
psychological. But this line of reasoning quickly becomes problematic. Presumably, the notion 
of ‘time’ used by physics was refined and changed gradually. And so at what point did physics 
officially switch from being ‘folk’ to ‘scientific’ in its usage? How different did the concept need 
to become before it was no longer folk physics, and became a legitimately scientific term? Are 
engineers still doing folk physics when they make reference to time in the context of Newtonian 
mechanics (as opposed to employing the more accurate quantum mechanics)? There is still a 
family resemblance between the scientific notion of ‘time’ and the colloquial folk notion. If there 
were not, then why continue to use the term at all? Why not abandon it as we did ‘phlogiston’ 
and ‘ether’? 
 The assumption that there must be some particular sufficient change to a concept in order 
for it to officially shift from ‘folk’ to ‘scientific’ ignores the important observation made by 
Wilfred Sellars that scientific terminology is an extension of ordinary language ([1956]). 
Scientific theories and practices are still generated within a natural language. Assuming that we 
                                                 
4
 This is why the Fundamental Attribution Error is so prevalent. 
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can draw a definitive and clear distinction between ‘scientific’ language and ‘folk’ language is 
therefore something we must be cautious of. 
Perhaps one might argue that the physics case is importantly different from the 
psychology case in that a concept like ‘time’ still has an important role to play in our best 
scientific practices, while the same is not true of PAAs in scientific psychology. Thus, perhaps 
we can offer a second possible argument for the classification of PAAs as folk psychological, 
even when used as part of theories in psychology and cognitive science: 
 
2. Even if PAAs are used as part of theories and models in scientific domains like social and 
comparative psychology, their meanings are (at least partially) determined by their place 
within the folk conceptual framework from which they originated, and such mentalistic 
terminology is not necessary for a correct scientific understanding of the mind. 
 
There are different ways in which such a claim might be cashed out. For instance, we can make 
sense of this claim in the following ways: 
 
2(a). PAAs do not correctly describe the actual cognitive states and processes of the mind. In 
other words, they do not denote natural kinds. 
 
2(b). PAAs are embedded in theories of the mind which are known to be false. 
 
2(c). PAAs are dispensable to the scientific study of the mind. 
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I propose that each of these possibilities, even if true, is unhelpful for making sense of the 
folk/scientific divide. Let us examine each in turn to see why. 
According to 2(a), science is explicitly in the business of identifying natural kinds, and so 
psychological concepts must identify natural kinds in order to validate their place within a 
scientific psychology (for some examples, see: Sehon [1997]; Devitt & Sterelny [1987]; Griffith 
[2004]; Machery [2009]). Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, for instance, claim that ‘if 
psychological kinds are not natural kinds, then folk cognitive psychology cannot be protoscience 
[or science]’ ([1987], p. 242).  If one accepts these sorts of views, then the question of whether 
PAAs should be included as part of scientific psychology depends on their ability to successfully 
denote natural kinds. 
 For the sake of argument, let us suppose that natural kinds genuinely exist (a topic of 
much debate in the philosophy of science), and let us also suppose that propositional attitudes do 
not denote natural kinds. Could this validate the claim that PAAs are folk psychological, even if 
they are used as part of theories in psychology and cognitive science?  I propose not. This is 
because, even if natural kinds genuinely exist, it is simply false to suggest that science is 
primarily in the business of identifying them, or that theories and models are only considered 
scientific when they do so. 
 Examples abound in science of descriptions and models that do not attempt to 
characterize the natural kinds of systems. Take, for example, Hodgkin & Huxley’s mathematical 
model of the action potential in the squid giant axon ([1952]). The equations developed by 
Hodgkin & Huxley have been extremely influential in physiology and neuroscience. As Carl 
Craver notes: 
 
  
17 
 
 [The equations] summarize decades of experiments. They embody a rich temporal 
 constraint on any possible mechanism for the action potential. They allow neuroscientists 
 to predict how current will change under various experimental interventions. They can be 
 used to simulate the electrophysiological activities of nerve cells. They permit one to 
 infer the values of unmeasured variables. And they constitute potent evidence that a 
 mechanism involving ionic currents could possibly account for the shape of the action  
 potential. ([2006], p. 363). 
 
Despite providing these scientific virtues, the model does not attempt to identify the natural 
kinds that constitute the mechanisms producing the time course of the action potential. Instead, 
the model is merely a mathematical description that remains agnostic as to the possible 
underlying implementation of the system. As Hodgkin himself notes: 
 
 As soon as we began to think about molecular mechanisms it became clear that the 
 electrical data would by themselves yield only very general information about the class of 
 system likely to be involved. ([1992], p. 291) 
 
Despite this, Hodgkin & Huxley’s model is hardly considered unscientific simply in virtue of not 
identifying natural kinds. On the contrary, Hodgkin & Huxley’s model won them the Nobel Prize 
in physiology. Thus I propose that the question of whether PAAs correspond to natural kinds is 
largely irrelevant to the question of whether they are folk or scientific, since many 
uncontroversially scientific theories and models do not identify natural kinds at all (many 
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statistical models, for instance, do not). Perhaps the problem is that PAAs do not have the same 
value to scientific methodology that Hodgkin & Huxley’s model did? 
 This brings us to 2(b).  Perhaps the problem with PAAs is that they fail to be scientific in 
virtue of the fact that they belong to an incorrect theory of the mind? The problem with this idea 
is that the complexities involved in scientific representation often require idealizations, 
simplifications, and distortions which result in false theories that are nevertheless useful and 
important in science (for details, see: Teller [2001]; Batterman [2002]; Woods & Rosales 
[2010]).  To suggest that incorrect theories are unscientific is to ignore a good deal of genuine 
scientific practice which knowingly works with false characterizations of systems for numerous 
pragmatic reasons. 
 More importantly for our purposes, however, is the fact that false theories are not 
necessarily folk theories.  Quantum mechanics may have replaced Newtonian mechanics as our 
best physical theory, but this does not retroactively make Newtonian Mechanics folk physics. 
Likewise, if quantum mechanics is overturned at some point in the future, this would not ipso 
facto mean that quantum mechanics was a folk theory all along. Thus, even if PAAs are 
embedded in psychological theories that are false, this is insufficient to argue that the theory is 
folk; especially given the fact that, as noted above, the use of PAAs as part of theories and 
models in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology differ from their use in 
colloquial everyday contexts. They may prove to be part of false scientific theories, but they 
would still be part of scientific psychology nonetheless. 
 Let us turn finally to 2(c). Perhaps PAAs are not part of scientific psychology because 
our present scientific theories of the mind do not require that we posit such entities at all? It has 
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been argued by a number of philosophers that PAAs are likely dispensable to our scientific 
understanding of the mind. Christopher Gauker, for instance, claims that:  
 
 What I don’t see is any evidence that we can reliably predict what people will do in a way 
 in which attributions of belief and desire [and other PAAs] play an ineliminable role. [...] 
 Nor even have I ever heard of a single real-life example in which it was at least quite 
 plausible that one person successfully predicted the behavior of another [and] it was not 
 evident that the same prediction could have been made in other ways. ([2009])  
 
Or consider John Bickle, who argues that there is ‘no need to saddle our ontology of the mind 
with “folk psychology”.’ ([2003], p. 8). But even if Gauker and Bickle are correct, and PAAs are 
not indispensable to scientific practice, this would hardly be enough to justify the further claim 
that they are inherently unscientific as a result. Science is not in the business of only using 
theories and models that are shown to be indispensable. To emphasize this point, consider Hartry 
Field’s argument that we could, in principle, do science without using numbers ([1980]).   Field 
famously argues that it is possible to do science without quantifying over abstract objects like 
numbers or functions.  Now, I do not propose to argue for Field’s position here.  Instead, let us 
suppose for the sake of argument that his project proves successful.  In which case, numbers are 
dispensable to science. Would this therefore make all current mathematical equations in science 
folk, as opposed to scientific?  That seems unlikely, or else virtually all of physics and 
neuroscience would be folk. Similarly, if scientific inclusion is based on indispensability, then 
we have little grounds to consider very much of current science to be genuinely scientific. We 
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have not shown that our best theories in neuroscience or quantum mechanics are, in principle, 
indispensable. 
Lastly, let us consider a third possible explanation for the classification of PAAs as folk 
psychological, even when used as part of theories in cognitive science and psychology: 
 
3. Science is a strictly descriptive practice. PAAs, on the other hand, are not descriptive 
but normative. Therefore, the application of PAAs cannot be scientific. 
 
Many philosophers have argued that PAAs involve an inherently normative component (Quine 
[1960]; Dennett [1987]; Sehon [1997]), and that this puts them at odds with scientific practice. 
Sehon describes the problem as follows: 
 
First, there is a normative character to our practices of mental state ascription that is 
foreign to the theories involving natural kinds in the sciences. The normative aspect of 
mental state ascription can be seen in several related ways. Most generally, when we 
ascribe mental states, we do so against the background assumption that we are dealing 
with a rational agent; i.e., we attribute propositional attitudes to an agent against our 
background conception of what she ought to believe and desire. [...] Attributing a 
completely irrational set of beliefs to an agent defeats the purpose of belief attribution, 
and the attribution itself loses sense. [...] However, scientific theorizing does not appeal 
to overtly normative standards in the way that mental state ascription does. Our choice of 
theories is not guided by an ideal conception of how the world ought to behave. ([1997], 
p. 334). 
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Thus, perhaps the folk nature of PAAs is rooted in their normative aspect.  To be genuinely 
scientific, a theory must eschew the sort of normativity inherent in PAAs. 
 The problem with this way of understanding the folk/scientific distinction is that it 
greatly misrepresents actual scientific practice. Sehon claims that ‘our choice of theories is not 
guided by an ideal conception of how the world ought to behave.’  Yet, this is simply not true in 
many cases.  Idealized models in science often work by doing exactly this. Instead of describing 
the way the world genuinely is, idealized models in science predict and explain phenomena by 
creating models of how the world ought to behave given various idealizations we build into our 
model, and then using this to draw inferences about the behaviour of real systems. Angela 
Potochnik, for example, argues that ‘the aim of [scientific] modeling is to indirectly represent a 
real-world system by describing a simpler, hypothetical system and investigating that simpler 
system, in order to draw conclusions about the actual system of interest’ ([forthcoming], p.48).  
She likewise notes that: 
 
The consensus in the literature on model-based science is that idealized models can 
represent despite their false assumptions. […] Idealizations represent features of systems, 
for they represent those systems as if they possessed features that they do not. This 
qualifies as representation in virtue of similarities in the behavior of the fictionalized 
representation and of the represented system(s), and as such, it contributes to the search 
for causal patterns. Idealizations, and the fictional entities and properties they posit, are 
thus integral to scientific practice. ([forthcoming], p.58) 
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Consider, for instance, the role that optimality models play in evolutionary biology (Beatty 
[1980], [1981]; Orzack & Sober [1994], [1996]; Rice [2004]; Potochnik [2007], [2010]; Woods 
& Rosales [2010]).  Optimality models are commonly used to investigate and predict the 
evolution of phenotypic traits within a given population not by describing how the evolutionary 
process actually works (often ignoring known genetic and epigenetic factors in the evolutionary 
process), but instead only by characterizing what sorts of traits would be optimal for the creature 
to have given the constraints of natural selection. In effect, these models predict real systems 
based on an ideal conception of which traits ought to be selected for if natural selection was the 
only causal factor in evolution, and always produced optimal results. 
 Or consider the study of phase transitions in physics, such as a fluid changing from a 
liquid phase to a solid phase.  In order for statistical mechanics to model this phenomenon 
effectively, we must model the system as if it had an infinite volume, allowing for infinite 
degrees of molecular freedom (See: Bub [1988], p. 71; Callender [2001], p. 549; Batterman 
[2002], [2011]). Just as with our application of optimality models, we do not describe the way 
the world is when we employ such models, but instead predict based on an ideal conception of 
how the world ought to behave if it allowed for things like infinite volumes. 
In this respect, many scientific models are normative in the same way that the attributions 
of PAAs are normative.  One can dispute whether such models will eventually be displaced in 
science when better models become available, but it is simply false to claim (as Sehon seems to) 
that they do not exist in science. If PAAs are folk psychological because they contain a 
normative component to them, then it would appear that optimality models in evolutionary 
biology, and statistical mechanics in physics, would likewise constitute folk biology and folk 
physics respectively. Yet very few, if any, would grant such a claim. If such normative models 
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are part of legitimate scientific inquiry, then so too are PAAs when used as part of scientific 
theories and models. 
How then are we to understand the distinction between folk psychology and scientific 
psychology?  Should we abandon the distinction altogether?  I propose not.  Instead, I suggest 
that turning to our understanding of folk physics may yield a clue. 
 
4 Grounding Scientific Terminology in Scientific Theory and Experimentation 
 
Given that terms like ‘time’ and ‘space’ can be found in both everyday folk contexts, as well as 
rigorous scientific contexts, we can conclude that it is not the terminology itself that makes an 
account folk physics as opposed to scientific physics. So what is it that differentiates folk physics 
from scientific physics?  For some insight, consider the following passage by Dennett: 
 
 Folk physics is the system of savvy expectations we all have about how middle-sized 
 physical objects in our world react to middle-sized events. If I top over a glass of water 
 on the dinner table, you leap out of your chair, expecting the water to spill over the side 
 and soak through your clothes. You know better than to try to sop up the water with a 
 fork, just as you know you can’t tip over a house or push a chain. You expect a garden 
 swing, when pushed, to swing back. [...] The truth in academic physics if often strongly 
 counterintuitive, or in other words contrary to the dictates of folk physics, and we need 
 not descend to the perplexities of modern particle physics for examples. The naive 
 physics of liquids would not predict such surprising and apparently magical phenomena 
 as siphons or pipettes (Hayes [1978]), and an uninitiated but clever person could easily 
  
24 
 
 deduce from the obvious first principles of folk physics that gyroscopes, the virtual 
 images produced by parabolic mirrors, and even sailing upwind were flat impossible. 
 ([1987], p. 8) 
 
If this is true, then the division between folk physics and scientific physics is based on the sorts 
of generalizations we make about physical systems.  The sorts of generalizations employed in 
folk physics are those that fit with our everyday intuitions about how physical objects behave, 
but which largely ignore scientific theorizing and experimentation.  Scientific physics, on the 
other hand, forms generalizations based on the results of scientific experimentation and the 
application of scientific theories.  As Bas Van Fraassen points out, ‘to ask that [explanations] be 
scientific is only to demand that they rely on scientific theories and experimentation, not old 
wives’ tales’ ([1980], pp. 129-130). This would explain why terms like ‘time’ and ‘space’ can be 
part of both folk and scientific physics. It is the sorts of generalizations we draw about time and 
space that are either folk or scientific depending on whether they are relevantly informed by 
scientific practice or not. 
 If we apply this lesson to psychology, then we can conclude that the scientific or folk 
status of PAAs is likewise determined by whether their usage in a given context is informed by 
scientific theories and experimentation.  If so, as is the case with the PAAs embedded within 
theories in social psychology and comparative psychology, then these mentalistic terms are not 
folk psychological, but scientific terms like any other. Note that this condition does not require 
that PAAs, nor the theories in which they are in embedded, first be vindicated by our best 
theories in neuroscience or cognitive science.  All that is required is that our psychological 
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theories were generated in accordance with the tenants of scientific practice.  If so, then it is not 
folk psychology. 
Of course, it is still common for people to use PAAs in everyday folk ways by making 
psychological generalizations that are largely divorced from rigorous scientific theories and 
practices. In these everyday contexts, PAAs are part of folk psychology. But this should not be 
particularly surprising; we use ‘time’ and ‘space’ in folk physical ways all the time in daily life 
as well.  Drawing a distinction between folk and scientific psychology can certainly be useful 
and beneficial.  It becomes dangerously misleading, however, when we speak of mentalistic 
vocabulary as being folk psychological even when used as part of empirically informed scientific 
theories and practices. 
 
5 Implications for the Neuroscientific Study of the Mind 
 
Why is it important that we not mislabel PAAs as folk psychological when part of scientific 
theories? The issue here is not merely clarity for clarity’s sake. This way of talking tends to 
downplay the value of scientific theories and models which invoke PAAs, or to brush them aside 
as merely ‘folk’ psychology. As Kathleen Wilkes notes, ‘once [a theory] is so baptised [as folk 
psychology], it inevitably finds it hard to live down its folksiness. There is an inbuilt temptation 
to see it as a bit twee, a bit primitive’ ([1993], p. 168). Dennett, for instance, tells us that we 
shouldn’t take the application of PAAs in science ‘too seriously’ ([1987], p. 350, emphasis in 
text). Likewise, Penn argues that psychological theories which employ folk psychological 
terminology (which he defines in terms of PAAs) have no place in modern cognitive science 
(2012, p.256). Yet, to downplay the value of psychological models and theories which invoke 
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PAAs for being folk psychological would be to risk trivializing data that is extremely important 
to the neuroscientific study of the brain. We know empirically that psychological models which 
employ PAAs can provide information about the ways in which cognitive systems behave in a 
variety of contexts, and can be predictive of a range of different behaviours (see footnote 5). This 
sort of behavioural data is essential to neuroscientific research given that it puts essential 
constraints on how to build and test our neurological models.  Put simply, neuroscience needs to 
know what the behavioural regularities of the system are in order to determine how they can be 
produced by the underlying neurological mechanisms.  As Patricia Churchland notes: 
 
Crudely, neuroscience needs psychology because it needs to know what the system does; 
that is, it needs high-level specifications of the input-output properties of the system. 
Psychology needs neuroscience for the same reason: it needs to know what the system 
does. That is, it needs to know whether lower-level specifications bear out the initial 
input-output theory, where and how to revise the input-output theory, and how to 
characterize processes at levels below the top. (Churchland 1989, p. 373) 
 
On a similar note, Chris Eliasmith and Oliver Trojillo have recently claimed that: 
 
The ‘top-down’ approach [to generating large-scale brain models] allows us to use the 
vast knowledge gained through behavioral sciences to impose constraints on the model. 
This allows us to use the model to test hypotheses about the functions of different brain 
regions. (2014, p.4) 
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To illustrate, consider well-documented cognitive biases regarding judgments of probability, 
such as the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ or the ‘hot hand fallacy’. There is a great deal of evidence that 
people do not naturally think about probabilities in a way that accords with probability theory, 
and instead misrepresent probabilities based on the outcomes of previous unrelated events. Any 
complete neuroscientific account of cognition must account for these biases in reasoning.  Thus, 
knowing the sorts of judgments we in fact make about probabilities, the contexts in which we 
make them, and the circumstances that influence them, tells us what sorts of conditions and 
constraints our neurological models must meet.  If our neurological models are unable to match 
the actual behaviours that humans display in the real world, then they cannot be an accurate 
account of our cognitive processes. Thus, we can test our neurological models by comparing 
them against the behavioural data we have in order to determine if they can account for the sorts 
of behaviours we empirically observe. 
 Meanwhile, it is important to note that the majority of behavioural data we have on biases 
such as the gambler’s fallacy and hot hand fallacy have been gathered using psychological 
theories and models that interpret behaviour in terms of ‘beliefs’ and ‘expectations’ (for just a 
small sampling, see: Tversky & Kahneman [1971], [1972]; Gilovich, Vallone & Tversky [1985]; 
Clotfelter & Cook [1993]; Keren & Lewis [1994]; Ayton & Fischer [2004]; Burns & Corpus 
[2004]; Sundali & Croson [2006]; Sun & Wang [2010]).  Of course, the fact that this behavioural 
data was generated using psychological theories and models that happen to make reference to 
PAAs is irrelevant to whether or not they identify genuine biases regarding our evaluations of 
probabilities, and characterize relevant conditions under which these biases manifest themselves.  
In this respect, they provide essential data for neuroscientific research, even if they appealed to 
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PAAs in order to attain it. To dismiss or abandon all this data for being ‘folk psychological’ 
would be to needlessly obstruct our ability to neuroscientifically study such biases. 
It is also worth noting that this is the case not only when learning about neurological 
mechanisms in humans, but also in animals. Recall Papineau & Heyes’ insistence that it is easy, 
if not irresistible, to interpret animal behaviour in terms of PAAs.  They note that we ‘naturally 
assume that the birds who imitated did so because they wanted food and believed that performing 
the same action as the demonstrator would enable them to get it’ (Papineau & Heyes [2006], p. 
188). With this in mind, let us consider a similar such irresistible interpretation when it comes to 
the behaviour of frogs.  It might likewise be easy, if not irresistible, for scientists to characterize 
frogs as ‘believing’ that any darting black object is food, and thus can be ‘fooled’ into 
‘believing’ that small darting images on a computer monitor are food.  Likewise, that frogs can 
only ‘recognize’ flies when they are in motion, and not stationary.  Even though this way of 
describing the behaviour of frogs is couched in propositional attitude terminology, this sort of 
characterization provides all kinds of information regarding what sorts of stimuli frogs respond 
to, and under what conditions.  This sort of behavioural data has proven extremely important in 
the study and understanding of motion sensitive neurons within the frog’s visual system (see, for 
example, Lettvin et al. [1959]). 
One might feel tempted to point out that such behavioural data in social psychology and 
comparative psychology could easily have be gathered without the use of mentalistic 
terminology, and so the presence of PAAs is not essential for generating the behavioural data 
that neuroscientists need.  Yet even if this is true, it would be to miss the point. The point is not 
that PAAs are necessarily ineliminable or indispensable for gathering such data, but that it is a 
descriptive fact that a great deal of this data has been, and continues to be, generated using 
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models which do invoke such terminology. Thus, to be dismissive of such theories simply 
because of the terminology they choose to invoke would be to cut ourselves off from decades of 
psychological research that we know empirically provide exactly the sort of information that 
neuroscientists need in order to refine and improve their models. Whether we could have 
acquired this sort of behavioural data by employing different sorts of theories and models is 
simply not relevant to whether the models we have do provide this information, and whether it is 
valuable.  By analogy, consider once again the Hodgkin & Huxley model.  This model was 
hugely influential in neuroscience, and provided a great deal of information regarding the 
behaviour of the time course of the action potential.  Yet Hodgkin and Huxley themselves noted 
that they did not need to employ those particular equations in order to generate the same 
behavioural data of the time course.  Different sets of equations would have worked equally as 
well.  As they themselves put it: 
 
An equally satisfactory description of the voltage clamp data could no doubt have been 
achieved with equations of very different form, which would probably have been equally 
successful in predicting the electrical behaviour of the membrane. ([1952], p. 541) 
 
Do we therefore conclude that, because we could have used a different set of equations, the 
Hodgkin & Huxley model therefore did not provide us with essential behavioural data used in 
the study of the underlying neurological mechanisms?  Ought we to have been dismissive of the 
scientific value of the model on the grounds that we could have used a different set of equations?  
Not at all.  Likewise, the fact that scientific models which employ PAAs have generated, and 
continue to generate, important information regarding behaviour is not undermined by the fact 
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that different kinds of descriptions may have yielded similar data.  To dismiss these models as 
mere ‘folk psychology’ because they employ PAAs as opposed to other forms of descriptions 
would be akin to dismissing the Hodgkin & Huxley model as unscientific because it uses the 
particular equations they do instead of using others.  In both cases, we would be needlessly 
cutting ourselves off from important sources of empirical data. Psychological theories and 
models which employ mentalistic terminology provide essential insights into behaviour needed 
in the neuroscientific study of the brain, and their scientific contributions continue to be 
important. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
There has been a tendency to view PAAs as folk psychological, even when employed as part of 
explicit psychological theories and models.  In this paper, I have argued this view is problematic, 
and potentially harmful to neuroscientific practice.  
All this does not imply that PAAs are indispensible to the sciences of the mind, nor does 
it imply that our best cognitive or neuroscientific theories will ultimately vindicate the existence 
of propositional attitudes. Instead, the point is that such issues are ultimately irrelevant to our 
understanding of whether a term is part of folk or scientific psychology. To insist that PAAs are 
folk psychological when embedded in scientific theories can result in a tendency to downplay the 
important role that psychological generalizations play in our scientific study of the mind, and this 
can hinder scientific progress. 
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